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Abstract 
Offshore Wind Farm consists of an array of Wind Turbines electrical, communication, command and control systems. At 
present the cost of maintaining Wind Turbines in the offshore locations is very high (about 35% of lifetime costs). This work 
puts emphasis on using failure analysis as a basis for designing a condition based prognostic maintenance plan in order to 
control cost of power and make maintenance more efficient. An essential aspect of such failure analysis is to identify wind 
turbine components, ascertain their failures and find root causes of the failures. However as a first step, identification of 
prominent failures in the critical assemblies of a wind turbine using available inspection methods and making provisions to 
control their occurrence would make significant contribution in improving wind turbine reliability. This work introduces Failure 
Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) as an important failure analysis tool that has in the past successfully benefitted 
the airlines, marine, nuclear and spacecraft industries. FMECA is a structured failure analysis technique that can also evaluate 
the risk and priority number of a failure and hence assist in prioritising maintenance works. The work shows, how with a slight 
modification of the existing FMECA method, a very useful failure analysis method can be developed for offshore wind turbines 
including its operational uniqueness. This work further proposes modifying the format for calculating the Risk Priority Number 
(RPN) for wind turbine failure. By using wind turbine gearbox as a case study, this work illustrates the usefulness of RPN 
number in identifying failures which can assist in designing cost effective maintenance plan. Some preliminary results of a 
FMECA tool that has been developed to automatically evaluate the effects and criticality of a failure in a wind turbine at the 
component level is included.                 
 
Keywords: FMECA, offshore wind turbine, optimal maintenance, consequences of failure, RPN Number  
 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
Primarily there are three maintenance schemes: Time Based Maintenance (TBM), Failure 
Based Maintenance (FBM) and Condition Based Maintenance (CBM). In TBM and FBM schemes, 
maintenance is performed at fixed intervals and on machine failures respectively, however in CBM 
maintenance is performed based on the condition of machine components. So while in TBM simple 
failures may get aggravated and result in long downtimes, and in FBM, maintenance planning for 
every failure increases the overall operations cost, CBM has on many occasions proved to be an 
economical maintenance scheme that has utilised resources efficiently1,2,3,4. However for CBM 
maintenance scheme it is important that information about the condition of machine components are 
as accurate as possible so that a simple (severe) failure can be economically serviced without them 
turning into a severe (catastrophic) failure. For CBM it is equally important that a database exists that 
contains categorisation and ranking of all major failures so that in the event of a failure such database 
can be referenced to readily determine the consequences of a failure. Such a database can be made 
by analysing failures right at the machine component level. So failure analysis is the first step in 
planning for a prognostic CBM so as to make maintenance more economical.  
 
  
 
            (a)            (b) 
 
          (c)            (d)            (e)             (f) 
           
(g) 
Figure 1.   Examples of visual inspection of wind turbine gearbox (a) Air Breather Filter (oily), (b) ring Gear Intermediate 
Shaft (Pitting), (c) Planet Gear Low Speed Side (Meshing Interference), (d) Pinion Intermediate Speed Shaft (heavy 
corrosion), (e) Pinion High Speed Shaft (Pitting), (f) Oil Level Indicator (low oil level), (g) Intermediate Shaft Bearing 
Generator Side (Heavy Pitting) (Pictures: Stork Technical Services, Aberdeen) 
The above pictures (Figure 1) show examples of failures in a wind turbine gearbox. By observing the 
extent of failure and by finding the impact of such failure from failure analysis, valuable information 
about the consequences of a failure can be obtained which can then be used to plan for maintenance. 
Failure analysis can also help ascertain the nature and root causes of a failure and its effects, clues 
which can assist in redesigning and manufacturing better machine parts or to incorporate 
compensatory provisions. The next section shows how failure analysis can economise maintenance. 
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1.2. Role of Failure Analysis in economising maintenance 
Some major advantages of failure analysis in the economisation of machine maintenance are: 
 Capable of identifying the root cause of a failure 
 Assist in designing control systems to mitigate failures/effects 
 Improve product designs5 
 Ascertain the damage caused by failure on machine (low, medium, sever etc.) 
 Ascertain the local and widespread impact of a failure in the machine 
 Analyse performance changes due to failures 
 Ascertain downtime and estimation of maintenance costs  
 Provides rational for maintenance implementation 
 Improves the reliability of the overall system without incurring appreciable downtime 
 
However there are some limitations to failure analysis, and they are: 
 It is probabilistic and subjective as it is largely based on personal experiences and knowledge  
 Inaccurate failure analysis can results in under- or over maintenance and hence increase costs 
 Failure caused due to combined effect of many reasons is difficult to analyse using such technique 
 It is a time consuming and repetitive process and needs periodic updating 
 
A major advantage of having a reference database containing failure analysis results is that by 
having knowledge about a failure and its consequences, arrangements can be made for maintenance 
prior to the time of actual failure. Under ideal situations, a time should be chosen when consequences 
of the failure do not outweigh the benefits of maintenance so that the lifetime maintenance cost is as 
economical as possible. A decision flow diagram for maintenance planning upon detecting adverse 
consequences of failures in a wind farm is shown in Figure 2. It can be inferred from Figure 2 that 
maintenance in itself is a useful aspect of failure analysis which reduces the consequences of failure.        
  
 
Figure 2   A decision flow diagram for maintenance using CBM 
1.3. Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) 
 Several failure analysis methods and tools are now available to identify the reasons machine 
components do not work well. Some of them are: Cause-Consequence Analysis, Checklist Analysis, 
Event Tree Analysis, Fault Tree Analysis, Hazard & Operability Analysis, Failure Modes and Effects 
Analysis (FMEA), Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA), What-If Analysis, etc.6. 
FMECA7 was initially designed for the aviation sector which later was also used in the nuclear, 
railways, marine and many other risk based industries. A distinctive advantage of FMECA is its highly 
sequential and structured approach towards finding the effect, severity and consequence of a failure. 
FMECA is a 2 step process - (1) Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), and (2) Criticality 
Analysis (CA). The process for performing FMEA and CA are given below in Step 1 and Step 2.      
 
STEP 1: FMEA 
• Define system, find its subsystems and components and make their block diagram 
• Identify failure modes and failures for each block diagram 
• Analyse local and high level effect of such failures 
• Identify failure detection, isolation, compensation and resolution techniques 
• Evaluate the after effects of failure resolution 
 
STEP 2: CA 
• Qualitative Approach (when data is unavailable) – Rank failures into 5 levels according to occurrence. 
Level A – Frequent, Level B – Probable, Level C – Occasional, Level D – Remote, Level E – Unlikely 
• Quantitative Approach (when data is available) – Rank failures according to Criticality Number, where 
        
                     Criticality Number (Cm) = β α λ t, Item Criticality Number = Σ (Cm)           Equation 1 
 
Where,  β = Failure Effect Probability, α = Failure Mode Ratio, λ = Part Failure Rate, t = Operating Time 
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Ranking failures according to their risk is vital information obtained from FMECA. Unlike 
Criticality Number (Equation 1), which is used to rank machine parts according to their criticality, Risk 
Priority Number (RPN) is used to rank failures according to their Severity, Occurrence and Detection. 
RPN number is calculated using Equation 2 where Severity denotes the extent of consequences of a 
failure, Occurrence denotes the likelihood of a failure and Detection denotes the ease of detecting a 
failure. For values of Severity, Occurrence and Detection (S,O,D), several references exists with 
different types of rankings, one amongst which is given in Table 1. According to this table, RPN 
values vary from 1 and 1000 and denote an increasing trend towards the need for maintenance.     
 
𝑹𝒊𝒔𝒌 𝑷𝒓𝒊𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝑵𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓 = 𝑺𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒚 ∗ 𝑶𝒄𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 ∗ 𝑫𝒆𝒕𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏           Equation 2 
 
 
Rating Severity (S) 
Occurrence (O) 
Detection (D) 
Probability Description 
1 Effect is not noticed < 10-5 Extremely Less Certain 
2 Very slight effect noticed 10-5 Remote Very high 
3 Slight effect causing annoyance 10-5 Very Slight High 
4 Slight effect causing return of product 4*10-4 Slight Moderate 
5 Moderate Effect causing return of product 2*10-3 Occasional Medium 
6 Significant Effect 1*10-2 Moderate Low Chance 
7 Major Effect 4*10-2 Frequent Slight 
8 Extreme Effect, system inoperable, safety issue 0.20 High Remote 
9 Critical Effect, System shutdown, Safety risk 0.33 Very High Very Remote 
10 Hazardous, Without warning, life threatening >=0.5 Extremely High No Chance, no inspection 
 
Table 1   Rating of Severity, Occurrence and Detection8 
 
1.4. Wind, Wind Farm and Wind Turbines 
Wind energy is a universally available perpetual reserve of abundant power that is convertible 
into electricity using the Wind Turbines. United Kingdom is rich in its terrestrial and oceanic winds that 
has resulted in the installation of many wind farms in the onshore (6.4 GW, growth rate 17%/year) and 
offshore (3.6 GW, growth rate 46%/year) locations9. However in-spite of increasing wind farm 
numbers, maintenance on average can cost up to 35% of the total costs (even more in some cases). 
It is estimated that wind farm maintenance would cost over 2 billion pounds each year by 202010 in 
the United Kingdom alone and hence there is acute requirement to control such high maintenance 
costs.  
 
A primary reason for such high costs is our limited understanding of wind turbine failures in the 
open spaces, especially in the offshore locations where we still need a reliability database. A 
preliminary requirement to control this cost is by making turbines components more resilient towards 
failure while operating in the outdoor conditions, a requirement which can be achieved by analysing 
wind turbine failures and making suitable recommendations to improve component design, replace 
component with changed specifications or proactively maintain its critical assemblies to reduce 
downtime. The first step of this process is to identify components of wind turbine and then analyse its 
component level failures. EU FP7 ReliaWind Consortium proposed a list of wind turbine parts that it 
grouped into subsystem, assembly, subassembly and components, where wind turbine was treated 
as a system. An abridged list of this proposal is given in Table 2 that shows different subsystems, 
assemblies etc. for a wind turbine. Although many components of this list can be further bifurcated, 
primarily those which are costly, however such information is useful to start a failure analysis.             
 
SYSTEM (WIND TURBINE) 
SUBSYSTEMS ASSEMBLIES SUBASSEMBLIES COMPONENTS 
Drive Train Module Gearbox Bearing Hose, Pump, Radiator, Thermostat, Motor 
Electrical Module Generator Cooling System Bushing, Case, Mounting, Torque Arm 
Nacelle Module Main Shaft Set Lubrication System Filter, Debris/Level/Pressure/Temp Sensor 
Rotor Module Auxiliary Electrical System Metrological / Nacelle/ other Sensors Fan, Resistance Controller, Lamination 
Support Structure Control & Communication System Rotor / Stator Slip Ring, Encoder, Wattmeter, Magnet 
Collection System Frequency Converter Structural & Mechanical Coupling, Rotor Lock, Shaft, Transformer 
Metrological System Power Electrical System High / Low Speed Side High speed / position sensor, Fan, Fuse 
Substation Hydraulic System Mechanical Brake Relay, Switch, Power Point, Pushbutton 
 Nacelle Auxiliary Electrical Services Space Heater, Surge Arrester, UPS 
 Yaw System Lightening Protection System Circuit Breaker, Cable, Analogue Digital I/O 
 Blade Ancillary Equipment Data logger, Protocol Adapter Card, CPU 
 Pitch System Communication System Watch Dog Unit, Control Software 
 Foundation Condition Monitoring System Power / Vibration / Watch Dog Switches 
Table 2   An abridged listing of EU FP7 ReliaWind Consortium proposed wind turbine parts 
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More than 150 different types of components are listed for a wind turbine by the EU FP7 ReliaWind 
Consortium. So if on average each component is assumed to fail in 5 different failure modes and each 
failure mode is assumed to have about 5 different root causes, there would be a total of about 3750 
types of failures for analysis purpose. In view of the accuracy required from failure analysis and for 
the fact that failure analysis of about 3750 instances of failure is time consuming, costly to perform 
and requires association of maintenance professionals, few critical assemblies can be identified in a 
wind turbine and a failure analysis can for done on them as a starting point. Such failure analysis 
framework can then act as precedence for other assemblies. The next section aims to identify the 
main critical assemblies in a wind turbine. 
 
2. Results 
2.1. Identification of Wind Turbine Cost and Operation Critical Assemblies (WT-COCA) 
Identification of critical assemblies has operational advantages as maintenance can be 
prioritised for those prized assemblies of the wind turbine that will assist in significantly cutting down 
the consequences arising from downtime, spares requirement and the overall maintenance costs. 
Wind Turbine Cost and Operation Critical Assemblies (WT-COCA) is a name given to a group of wind 
turbine assemblies which satisfy majority of the following criterions.  
 
• High maintenance cost 
• Failure causes high downtime 
• Components critical for operation 
• High cost of spares / replacement, and 
• High frequency of failure 
 
In Table 3, a comparison has been made between the wind turbine nacelle assemblies to find 
WT-COCAs. Wind Turbine tower and foundation assembly failures are not considered in this work. It 
can be observed from Table 3 that Gearbox and Generator assemblies satisfy the conditions for being 
WT-COCA.  
   
     Parameter / Assembly Maintenance 
Cost 
Spares 
Cost 
Failure 
Downtime 
Failure Frequency Critical for 
Operation 
Gearbox Very High Very High Very High Medium Very High 
Generator Very High Medium Very High High Very High 
Main Shaft Set High High High Low Very High 
Auxiliary Electrical Sys. Medium Low Low Very High Medium 
Control & Communication Low Low Low Low Very High 
Frequency Converter Medium Low Low Low High 
Power Electrical System Low Low Low High Medium 
Hydraulic System Low Low Low Medium Low 
Nacelle Auxiliary High Medium Medium Low Medium 
Yaw System High High High Low High 
Blade Very High Very High Very High Low Very High 
Pitch System High High High Low High 
 
Table 3   Identifying COCA in Wind Turbine 
Above result is supported by another study11 where Gearbox and Generator were found to contribute 
towards the highest downtime and failures in a year and whose results are shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3   Plot of Wind Turbine subsystem failure and downtime (Quail, 2012) 
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There were some other studies as well which showed similar results based on their failure 
patterns. One study found that the Pitch System, Frequency Converter, Yaw System, Control System, 
Generator and Gearbox Assemblies were WT-COCA12, while another study has reported Blade, 
Generator, Gearbox, Electrical System and Yaw System to be the WT-COCA13 while yet another 
study has identified Electrical System, Rotor, Frequency Converter, Generator, Hydraulics System 
and Gearbox14 to be the WT-COCA, and many other studies also supported such findings. Such 
studies show that irrespective of wind turbine model and operating conditions, Gearbox and 
Generator were the common WT-COCA assemblies, results that support observation from Table 3.  
 
Electrical Systems have been often reported to be a major contributor of the most frequent 
failures in a wind turbine, contributing around 25%15- 45%16 of all reported failures in some of the 
cases. Although inexpensive to repair, replace and maintain, as compared to Gearbox and Generator 
parts, frequent repairs in the offshore location can be very costly and add to the wind turbine lifetime 
costs. So, there is a need to devise compensatory provisions (fail safe systems) for electrical 
components so that frequency of offshore visits can be controlled. There is a need to prioritise 
Gearbox, Generator and the Electrical System works in order to optimise wind turbine maintenance. 
To limit the scope of this paper this work will only consider wind turbine Gearbox as a test specimen 
to demonstrate the usefulness of failure analysis.  
  
2.2. Prerequisites from Failure Analysis of Wind Turbines 
For failure analysis to be of real use in wind turbines and to assist in designing an economical 
maintenance plan, failure analysis needs to answer, as reasonably as possible, many additional 
questions which were not asked in the traditional FMECA. They have been listed below. 
• What is the effect of external agents (wind, temperature, water wave) on a failure? 
• How do time varying operating conditions affect a failure? 
• Can we identify all major agents that can act together to cause a failure? 
• Can we identify qualitatively predicted failures relating to duration a wind turbine is in operation 
• How much time will it take for a typical repair to be done (MTTR)? 
• If maintenance is deferred, what effect it has on the operation with time? 
• Can we rank failures using other schemes as may be useful for wind turbine maintenance?  
 
In addition to such prerequisites, inherent deficiencies in traditional FMECA also need solution, like:  
 Subjectivity: Numbers chosen for (S, O, D) from Table 1 are based on individual’s perception of 
failure and hence RPN values differ with people and across industries 
 Prognostic Approach: Current format is based on analysing the present condition of component 
failure only and no estimate is made to find component condition at a future time  
 Influence of External Agents: Current format is incapable of analysing failures arising from the 
influence of many agents at a single time   
 Internal Agents: Current format is incapable of proposing the effect on failure if some parameter 
change abruptly 
 
 
Hence, from wind turbine perspective, there is a need to expand upon the conventional FMECA 
technique of failure analysis and accommodate new fields to cater to the novel requirements of wind 
turbine. The next section discusses such fields in FMECA.           
 
2.3.   Proposed FMECA Method for Wind Turbine Failure Analysis 
The above section discussed about the various fields that are necessary for analysing wind 
turbine failures. This section aims to recommend a structure of FMECA to analyse wind turbine failure 
that incorporates the above requirements. This is given in Table 4 that is subdivided into: 
 
 Define System – Identify different parts of a generic wind turbine 
 Define Failure – Identify the nature and type of failures in different parts of wind turbine 
 Root Cause – Identify the root causes of failures 
 Effect of Agents – Identify the effect of different agents on failure, like humidity, temperature etc. 
 Effect of Prolonging Upkeep Work – find the effect of postponing maintenance on failure   
 Futuristic Condition of Failure – identify the future condition of a failure if servicing is postponed  
 Failure Effect Analysis – identify the effect of a failure 
 Resolve Failure – identify techniques to detect and resolve failures 
 Quantitative Analysis – when prior failure data is unavailable, evaluate the likelihood of the failure  
 Qualitative Analysis – when data is available, statistically determine the key failing components 
 RPN Number – evaluate the ranking of a failure 
A progressive study into offshore wind turbine failures to form the basis for its maintenance optimisation  
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 Costs – Evaluate the costs associated with maintenance or no maintenance  
 Prioritising Failures – rank failures according to failure effect, future condition, RPN number etc. 
 Risk – Identify if the failure is prone to human error, specification conflict and management error 
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Table 4   Lists Recommended Fields for Analysing Wind Turbine failure 
RPN values for prioritising failures is a subjective technique whose value varies with the choice of the 
reference table17,18,19 and the skillsets of the user. Based on user preferences, the value of RPN may 
range tremendously. For example a variation of 1 point in each of the values of (S,O,D = 4,6,4) taken 
from Table 1 would result in a changed RPN value of 175 (S,O,D = 5,7,5) instead of 64, an increase 
of about 3 times the original RPN number. Such an ambiguity in failure analysis can lead to over and 
under maintenance of machines. In situations involving high costs, such deviating results could hinder 
identification and prioritisation of components needing repairs. Hence there is a need to reduce such 
subjectivity without affecting the accuracy and importance of RPN value. The scope of such work 
should incorporate:  
1. Limiting the number of levels to fewer options 
2. Investigate into a general value system for Severity, Occurrence and Detection  
3. Limits the upper bound of RPN to a maximum value, and 
4. Design a scheme that improves coherence between RPN values calculated by different users    
 
A scheme is proposed below to provide a value to Severity, Occurrence and Detection. In this 
scheme (Figure 4) three relevant questions are asked under each category with an expected answer 
of either ‘YES’ (Value = 2) or ‘NO’ (Value = 1). The answers to each of the questions under (S,O,D) 
headings are then multiplied to give RPN value. So the minimum and maximum values of (S,O,D) 
would be (1,1,1) and (8,8,8), that would give RPN values (Equation 1) of 1 and 512. By restricting the 
number of possible answers it is more likely that a coherent RPN values can be obtained (Table 5). In 
order to improve the accuracy of RPN number, these questions would need to be customised for 
different components. For example questions related to Severity (Figure 4) may be quite right for 
bearing and casing, however for an electrical system such questions can change to “Does failure 
result in complete loss of power generation?”, “Can we detect current?” and “Is output available on 
screen?”.             
 
 
Figure 4   A new scheme to provide values to (S,O,D) 
SEVERITY 
• Is the failure widespread? 
• Does it have local effect? 
• Does it have a system wide effect?                           
(YES/NO) = (2/1) 
OCCURRANCE 
• Is this failure frequent? 
• Is root cause of failure still present? 
• Are there chances of Human Error 
during rectification?                     
(YES/NO) = (2/1) 
DETECTION 
• Is failure difficult to  detect? 
• Is failure undetectable using available 
techniques? 
• Does it take long time to detect a 
failure?                                           
(YES/NO) = (2/1) 
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2.4. Failure Analysis of Wind Turbine Gearbox 
In Figure 5 a functional block diagram of a gearbox has been shown along with its lubricating 
and cooling systems but without sensors. It can be seen that a failure in either of the Couplers, 
bearing, shaft, gear, case, mounting etc. will directly lead to the failure of the whole system. An 
abridged failure analysis is shown in Table 5 for a gearbox for brevity. From Table 5 we can identify 
different types of failure modes, their root causes and determine the RPN number of these failures. 
RPN number evaluated by the traditional (Table 1) and the modified schema (Section 2.3) are 
compared in the Table 5. By comparing the RPN values from the two systems we can see that 
housing mounting upon excessive play would determine the maximum value of RPN in the traditional 
system (196), according to the proposed system housing adjustment (128) would rank higher in terms 
of failure RPN number. Service personal can greatly benefit by the use of the recommended system.        
   
 
Figure 5   A functional block diagram of a gearbox assembly 
3. A Software Tool to find FMECA of Wind Turbine failure 
  A software tool has been designed using C# programing language and SQL database. A 
database has been designed using the fields shown in Table 4 that acts as an easy reference for 
evaluating the effect, risk and service cost for a failure in a wind turbine. In its present form this tool 
can only show the generic failures of wind turbine components but that needs to be updated in time 
as wind turbine failures data becomes available. This tool is generic and as it is capable of evaluating 
the key fields of FMECA. Some screenshots of this FMECA tool is shown in Figure 6 where it is seen 
that failure probability for a rotor exciter is 0.5 while for a hollow shaft is 0.33.    
4. Conclusion 
Wind Turbine maintenance is costly as they operate in uncontrolled environments where failure 
can occur due to internal/external reasons or their mixture. this study lists the limitations of using 
traditional FMECA method. It further broaden the utility of FMECA technique by incorporating 
additional fields and hence make it more useful in making maintenance decisions for wind turbines. A 
new system for allocating values to Severity, Occurrence and Detection was seen to provide better 
results to evaluate the RPN number. Since management and analysis of big database, such as a 
FMECA database for wind turbine, is quite labour intensive work, a need was felt for construction of a 
tool to study this database. This work shows evidence of a software tool that is designed to assist in 
studying the database. 
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Table 5   An abridged FMECA for Wind Turbine COCA - Gearbox 
Sub Assembly Component Failure Mode Cause Traditional (S,O,D) 
Proposed 
(S,O,D) 
Traditional 
RPN 
Proposed 
RPN 
Bearing X Worn Worn Out, Fatigue (5,3,6) (4,2,1) 90 9 
Bearing X Binding/Sticking Binding, Sticking, Seized, Jammed (7,2,4) (4,2,1) 56 8 
Bearing X Excessive Play Worn-Excessive Play (5,2,7) (8,1,4) 70 32 
Bearing X Loss of Lubrication Lubricant Dried Out  (7,3,3) (8,1,1) 63 8 
Cooling System Hose Broken Broken (3,1,2) (2,1,1) 6 2 
Cooling System Hose Worn Worn Out (3,1,6) (1,1,1) 18 1 
Cooling System Hose Cracked/Fractured Cracked/fractured (3,2,3) (2,1,1) 18 2 
Cooling System Hose Leaking Leaking (4,1,3) (2,1,1) 12 2 
Cooling System Pump Leaking Leak, Leaking (2,1,5) (4,2,1) 10 8 
Cooling System Pump No Operation No Transmission,  Catastrophic-Failure While Running (7,3,3) (8,1,1) 63 8 
Cooling System Pump Shorted Short (5,2,4) (8,2,1) 40 16 
Cooling System Radiator Leaking Internal Leak (3,3,5) (2,1,2) 45 4 
Cooling System Radiator Out of Adjustment Needs Adjustment/Out of Adjustment (3,2,8) (2,2,2) 48 8 
Cooling System Radiator Needs Replacement Needs replacement (3,3,5) (2,2,2) 45 8 
Cooling System Reservoir Leaking Leaking (3,2,2) (4,2,2) 12 16 
Gears Hollow Shaft Seized Worn Shaft/Keyway, Seized (8,2,8) (8,4,1) 128 32 
Gears Hollow Shaft Cracked, Fractured Cracked, Fractured (7,2,7) (8,4,2) 98 64 
Gears Hollow Shaft Bent, Dented, Warped Warped (7,3,6) (4,4,4) 126 64 
Housing Bushing Loose Vibration, Loose Screw, Misfire (5,2,9) (2,2,2) 90 8 
Housing Bushing Corroded Corroded, Seized (1,2,3) (2,2,2) 6 8 
Housing Case Cracked, Fractured Cracked, Vibration Cracked (7,2,7) (2,2,4) 98 16 
Housing Case Out of Adjustment Out of Adjustment (5,3,7) (8,4,4) 105 128 
Housing Case Broken Broken, Damaged (8,2,8) (4,2,2) 128 16 
Housing Mounting Excessive Play Internal Failure, Excessive Play (7,4,7) (4,2,8) 196 64 
Lubrication System Motor Broken Broken (3,5,4) (2,2,2) 60 8 
Lubrication System Motor Excessive Play Internal Failure, Excessive Play, No Failure, Excessive Play (4,2,2) (4,2,2) 16 16 
Lubrication System Motor Aged/Deteriorated Aged, Deteriorated, Leaking Hydraulic Oil, Unserviceable, Aged (6,3,4) (4,2,2) 72 16 
Lubrication System Filter Broken Broken Damaged, Part Struck (7,4,3) (8,2,4) 84 64 
Lubrication System Filter Cracked/Fractured Part Struck-cracked (4,3,5) (2,4,2) 60 16 
Lubrication System Filter Aged/Deteriorated Deteriorated/Aged - Cracked (3,3,6) (4,1,2) 54 8 
Lubrication System Pump Fails during Operation Catastrophic Fails while running (3,5,3) (2,2,1) 45 4 
Lubrication System Pump Degraded Operation Degraded (6,3,5) (2,1,2) 90 4 
Sensors Debris Zero or Maximum Output Catastrophic -Zero or Maximum output (4,2,5) (2,4,4) 40 32 
Sensors Oil Level Degraded Output Erratic Output, High/Low Value (6,2,6) (4,1,2) 72 8 
Sensors Pressure No Operation No Function with Signal (8,2,4) (4,4,4) 64 64 
Sensors Temperature Change in Resistance Low Resistance Value (6,3,2) (1,2,2) 36 4 
 
It is seen from above analysis that many high ranking failures in the traditional RPN system were actually countered by the proposed RPN system. The questions asked during the analysis constrains a user 
to focus on the problem and investigate further, thereby getting to know more about the failure. It is also reasonably possible to assume that in such circumstances chances of two users getting wide spread 
RPN values is less which thus brings coherence in RPN number system.        
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Figure 6   A Software Tool that shows FMECA results 
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